Washington State Gas Tax Increase Case Study

Though a combination of strong government and private leadership, increased agency credibility, well demonstrated and documented transportation needs, and strong marketing principles, the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) successfully requested and kept the largest funding program in the agency’s history.

Background
In July 2003, a five-cent-per-gallon gas-tax increase, approved by the Washington State Legislature, went into effect, funding $4.5 billion in priority projects (dubbed the “Nickel Package”). Just two years later, in April 2005, the Legislature approved another $8.5 billion for additional transportation projects, raising the gas-tax another 9.5 cents. These were the state’s first gas-tax increases and the first major influx of budget since 1991.

Nickel Package
The leadership of the Legislative Transportation Committee, with both houses of the Legislature created a package of transportation improvements funding with a five-cent gas-tax increase to raise $4.5 billion. The package was focused on a prescribed list of priority projects. Democrats and Republicans negotiated the investment in such a way as to allow legislators of both parties to support the Package and to prevent it from becoming an issue in future elections. The Legislature also approved a 0.3 percent sales tax on new and used vehicles to fund a “Multi-modal Transportation Account” chiefly to benefit transit agencies and passenger ferry service, and created an independent Transportation Performance Audit Board to monitor WSDOT reforms and programs.

Transportation Partnership Account (TPA)
As the WSDOT showed over the next two years, they were up to the task of managing and implementing projects funded under the Nickel Package. All but a few Nickel projects advanced toward completion on schedule and on budget.

As WSDOT’s performance improved, leaders from business, civic organizations, labor, and environmental groups from around the state formed a “Transportation Partnership” to lobby for new funding. New funding was developed - $8.5 billion, the largest single program ever contemplated for transportation in Washington. It was funded primarily by a 9.5-cent increase in the gas-tax, phased in over four years. Nearly half of the funding was to replace at-risk infrastructures, such as the Alaskan Way Viaduct and the SR 520 floating bridge.
Failed Repeal of TPA

Directly following the difficult but successful passage of the new TPA funding, an initiative was launched to repeal the tax. The Transportation Partnership, along with Legislative and Agency representatives worked tirelessly to keep the funding intact. Using print and television media, talk radio, and the Agency’s web page, they communicated the message that more investment was needed, and they successfully fended off the repeal.

Development

In November 2000, the Blue Ribbon Commission on Transportation warned, “Washington’s transportation system is on a collision course with reality.” Capital investment in the state’s transportation system had remained flat since 1980 while everything else had increased dramatically: population, employment, vehicle registrations, and vehicle miles traveled. The interstate highway system and other infrastructure were aging, while peak-hour congestion in major corridors increased.4

In 2001, Governor Locke proposed a $17.2 billion transportation package based on the Blue Ribbon Commission’s “Early Action Plan.” He also sought appointing authority over the Secretary of Transportation; neither moved forward in the Legislature.

In the middle of this debate, on February 28, 2001, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake shook the region. The quake damaged buildings, roads and public infrastructure throughout Western Washington, including the aging Alaskan Way Viaduct in Seattle. The earthquake, which was centered near Olympia, caused more than $1 billion in damage to roadways and infrastructure.

Governor Locke summoned the Legislature back to Olympia in late April of that year for three special sessions focusing on the transportation budget. However, he had no better results than he had had during the regular session. It appeared that the department was stuck.

However, on April 23, 2001, Doug MacDonald took charge of the WSDOT, becoming the fourth Secretary of Transportation. MacDonald had been the Executive Director of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, and over nine years, he guided the on-time and on-budget delivery of a $4 billion construction program for new wastewater facilities. On the heels of the Blue Ribbon Commission’s recommendations to the Legislature and Governor to implement benchmarks, tracking, and accountability measures within WSDOT, MacDonald’s reputation for hands-on management and a passion for public accountability led to his appointment as Secretary of WSDOT.

As MacDonald joined WSDOT, he faced a long list of unfunded transportation needs. But the immediate challenge was the public and legislative skepticism about WSDOT’s
Starting in 2001, Secretary MacDonald began to rebuild the public’s confidence in WSDOT. He focused on a few key items: delivery, accountability, and communication. He directed WSDOT divisions and programs to establish quantifiable benchmarks for monitoring their performance. “What gets measured gets managed,” was the new motto. MacDonald began a quarterly report to the Legislature, which was (and still is) posted on WSDOT’s website. These reports tracked all aspects of WSDOT’s work, from project design to maintenance and operations, along with the budgets and schedules for the work.

In 2002, the Legislature focused on the recommendations the Blue Ribbon Commission outlined in their 2000 report to the Legislature and Governor. The Legislature adopted a “transportation efficiency” bill based on the Commission’s recommendations, while MacDonald reached out to the Legislature with the “Grey Notebooks,” which measured the department’s performance, and to the public on talk radio and newspapers. The media praised WSDOT’s new accessibility, and the Puget Sound Business Journal found the Gray Notebook’s detail to be “addictive.”

While WSDOT began to institute changes, in 2002, Governor Locke put forward a scaled back version of the plan he proposed in 2001. As the Democrats had taken control of the House as well as the Senate, he expected to succeed. However, some feared that passage of a major gas-tax increase would spell trouble for November elections. As a compromise, the Legislature drafted legislation with two main features: a referendum to go to the voters to decide if they wanted a nine-cent gas-tax increase to fund a detailed transportation plan, and a new “Regional Transportation Investment District,” to raise regional revenue to meet the Puget Sound’s extraordinary needs.

If passed, the referendum (R-51) would fund $7.8 billion over ten years for transportation improvements. Although major business and labor interest were behind R-51, some environmental and pro-transit interests felt that the plan was too focused on highways. There was no partnership promoting the package, and R-51 failed by more than 60 percent.

After the failure of R-51, Secretary MacDonald and other WSDOT staff went on the road offering “straight talk about transportation.” Department officials spoke candidly to anyone that would listen about the challenges facing transportation, to publicize its progress, and to report on WSDOT’s performance. WSDOT was now able to show its improved project delivery, cost management for maintenance programs, and new business practices. In fact, WSDOT could now show improvements in most areas of operations due to the work done by MacDonald and his team.
to its implementation of new programs and systematic tracking of those programs and project progress.

The Nickel Package
Out of the public and Legislature’s increased confidence in WSDOT, coupled with the extraordinary transportation needs, emerged the Nickel Package. The five-cent gas-tax increase would raise $4.5 billion over the next ten years for projects that met specific, stringent criteria – the projects had to be “ready to go” and they had to be of “statewide or regional significance.” Using these criteria, the Legislature was able to create a list of projects that could be funded for this amount, understanding that they could not take care of all the transportation needs at one time. With the passage of the package, which was virtually uncontested, came new accountability measures. The Legislature established the general scope of each of the projects, the schedule, and the budget. WSDOT would be judged on whether they were able to meet each measure for each funded project.

WSDOT rose to the occasion. Though the specific scope, schedule, and budgets identified by the legislature limited WSDOT’s flexibility in delivery, Secretary MacDonald knew that if the department could deliver, they would win the trust of the legislature and the public. It worked.

TPA
As the Nickel projects moved toward completion, nearly all of them on time and on budget, discussions were continuing about the unmet transportation needs.

In the fall of 2003, Boeing announced that Washington would have to compete with other states as it determined where to assemble its 787 Dreamliner. Boeing had already surprised the public and government by shifting its corporate headquarters from Seattle to Chicago in 2001. Citing transportation as a big issue, it appeared that Boeing might take move a significant portion of its capital investment and payroll elsewhere.

Boeing’s CEO Alan Mulally publicly criticized Washington’s business climate, saying of the $4.2 billion Nickel transportation package, “This is a Band-Aid. This doesn’t even get you started.” Ultimately, Boeing keep production in Washington, but only after receiving promises that they would receive more than $3 billion in tax breaks and subsidies.

Against this backdrop, business leaders, civic organizations, labor, and environmental organizations leaders from around the state formed a “Transportation Partnership” to lobby the Legislature to fund critical statewide and regional transportation investment.

In January 2005, Democrats held a narrow majority in both the House and Senate. House Transportation Chair Ed Murray and Senate Transportation Chair Mary Margaret Haugen backed ambitious transportation improvement packages. Their Republican colleagues,
including Senator Jim Horn, gave qualified support to the effort for the package. In the last days of the 2005 session, a bill came out of the conference committee that outlined an improvement package costing $8.5 billion. If passed, it would be the largest transportation program in WSDOT’s history. It was to be funded by a 9.5-cent increase in the gas tax, which would be phased in over four years along with other fees. Nearly half of the funding was earmarked for replacing at-risk structures, including the Alaskan Way Viaduct, and the SR 520 floating bridge.

The bill passed the Senate, but failed in the House. Governor Gregoire and leaders from both parties were aided by the Transportation Partnership, and all parties worked feverishly to create solutions to legislator’s issues. Just hours before the House adjourned, the “Transportation Partnership Investment Fund” passed. It was passed with support from about one-third of Republicans, including conservatives like Senators Bill Finkbeiner, Joseph Zarelli, and Dan Swecker. It was important to them that, in companion legislation, independent auditing of the department’s performance was strengthened to help enforce wise spending.10

At the same time, legislation passed that shifted authority for appointing and overseeing the Secretary of Transportation from the Transportation Commission to the governor, though the Commission was retained as an organization.

Failed Repeal of TPA
Immediately after the TPA was passed, a public initiative was filed with the objective of repealing the funding (I-912).11 The backers of the repeal submitted over 420,000 signatures on I-912 petitions – nearly double the number needed to put it on the ballot.

Finding campaign funding to fight I-912 was difficult. When R-51 went forward to the ballot, businesses and organizations worked hard to get the package passed, contributing significant funds toward the effort. In spite of the significant funding – which bought polling studies, high quality commercials, air time on television and radio, mailings – the initiative failed. In this case, with the overwhelming number of signatures collected and early polling showing that I-912 would pass, transportation supporters were reluctant to contribute to what looked like a losing campaign. Therefore, the “No on I-912” campaign was run on a shoestring budget. However, the legislature had given the campaigners a powerful message to put forward: Look at the 274 projects you will lose if you vote for this initiative.

The Transportation Partnership, the collision of business, community, and environmental organizations, got together and created the “Keep Washington Moving” campaign. The organization conducted polling surveys that made it possible for them to focus their key
messages for the campaign, and helped them identify where to target those messages. Some of their key messages included:

- 274 new road projects across Washington – CANCELED. Initiative 912 takes it all away.
- I-912 slashes funding for roads, highways and bridges, and does nothing to relieve congestion.
- I-912 puts citizens and the economy at risk.
- Initiative 912 offers no alternative to today’s gridlock on key state highway.
- Say NO to more traffic, more costs, more risks to Washington
- Initiative 912 – a plan to do nothing.
- No on I-912 – no to more of the same.
- I-912 ignores safeguards put in place that ensure our tax dollars are spent wisely.

The list of projects defined by the legislature to be implemented became a significant communication opportunity for the defenders of the program. WSDOT was required by the legislature to identify, organize, and track all funded projects. WSDOT provided this information via its well organized website. Therefore, the agency was able to quickly tag the projects that would be cut if the initiative passed and make the information available to the public and the media. Every project had proponents in the form of legislators, organizations, and communities. Since the TPA program included projects throughout the state, each community could go to the website and see if a project in their community would be cut, allowing each community to know exactly what they were going to lose.

In addition, Keep Washington Moving used their limited funding to conduct ongoing polls, create posters, handouts, and mailings. They had their members participate in editorial boards and go on radio. Some of the headlines the were able to generate included:

- Spokane Spokesman-Review: “Critics of gas tax should halt deceit”
- Tacoma News Tribune: “Road revenues wrong target for anti-tax crowd”
- Seattle PI: “Highway Funding: Don’t hit the brakes”

Secretary MacDonald was a key part of those media messages, and he worked tirelessly speaking on radio and being interviewed for print and television news.

In the summer prior to the vote, polls showed that anti-tax talk-radio hosts were helping ensure the passage of I-912. While Secretary MacDonald was precluded from participating in campaigning or lobbying, he was expected to be responsive to requests for information made by the media. That summer and fall, he became a frequent talk radio guest, engaging in spirited debate about the repeal of the gas tax and the consequences it would have. MacDonald had excellent facts, which he articulated well, and he was able to easily explain the transportation needs. His grasp of the consequences of the repeal, in terms of the projects that would not be built, and the adverse effects on system’s performance which his
agency had been studiously tracking and reporting over several years, provided him with a strong and clear message that was repeated on talk radio for several months prior to the vote. Knowledgeable observers have credited the Secretary’s constructive use of talk radio – the very medium that might have ensured the tax repeal’s success – as the major reason for defeating the repeal and preserving a historic level of funding that pundits had been sure was about to be lost.

At the same time, WSDOT had gained a great deal of credibility, showing that it delivered its projects on time and on budget, with few exceptions. These factors became a winning combination, and the initiative to repeal the TPA funding failed, with 55% of the electorate voting not to repeal.

**Sponsors and Stakeholders**

There were a few key players over the years that made these initiatives successful, and ensured that once the funding was secured, it did not get taken away.

**Legislative Leadership**

According to those interviewed, both House Transportation Chair Ed Murray and Senate Transportation Chair Mary Margaret Haugen were key to passage of the transportation improvement packages. Senator Haugen began her efforts on the Blue Ribbon Commission, which focused on transportation needs and funding solutions. The commission was made up of many constituencies – from legislators to farmers, from city chamber members to labor representatives. In November 2000, the Commission made several important recommendations which the Legislature systematically implemented. Key recommendations included: adopting benchmarks and require agency accountability; providing funding for a strong state and regional transportation system; and providing the agency tools that promote efficiency.¹⁴

As the transportation needs became apparent, and the connection between a healthy transportation system and a health economy became clear, both Murray and Haugen became outspoken advocates for new investment in Washington’s transportation infrastructure.

**Secretary Doug MacDonald**

According to Senator Haugen, “Doug really took the Blue Ribbon Commission’s recommendations to heart!”

Secretary MacDonald changed the agency’s culture and its way of communicating externally, and in so doing, dramatically and quickly increased WSDOT’s credibility. MacDonald created a clear, focused message: delivery, accountability, and communication.
He told the public what WSDOT was going to do, WSDOT did the work, and he communicated how it went. MacDonald required that a special effort be made to tell the public the bad news as well as the good. He believed that telling the public bad news would build the agency’s credibility.

As the face of the agency, MacDonald was an invaluable champion. From the day he started working at the agency in 2001, he began to increase the department’s accountability and ensure that projects were being completed on-time and on-budget.

MacDonald effectively used the media. He organized state-wide road-shows targeted to editorial boards, local elected leaders and talk radio to make the case for funding and to demonstrate WSDOT’s performance record. This proved successful for several reasons – he articulated the department’s case well and he established relationships with people state-wide who hadn’t met with the Transportation Secretary in years, if ever.

**Transportation Partnership**

The issues were big, so there had to be a significant coalition built to get the budgets passed. Big business (Microsoft, Vulcan, Boeing), labor, and environmental organizations played important roles, and establishing the Transportation Partnership with an impressive list of diverse organizations helped convince the legislature that they had support to implement new taxes. This group was important for the Nickel package, but had an even more powerful impact on the Transportation Partnership Account (TPA), which raised the gas tax another 9.5 cents, and which was challenged through a citizen initiative, requiring a public vote. These groups funded the campaign, which was successful in retaining the tax increase. “This group can do things that a State agency cannot,” said Secretary Hammond.

When measured against the numbers of proponents in favor of these initiatives, here weren’t many opponents. There were anti-tax groups and organizations that argued that WSDOT could do more with less if it were more efficient. However, these arguments were shallow and ultimately didn’t have much of a following.

Those interviewed stated that there were also a few that didn’t like how the funding was allocated. Part of the issue revolved around a common argument, that the west side of the state, which included the City of Seattle, got more than its fair share of the funding. However, WSDOT was able to supply data collected over time that demonstrated that this wasn’t the case.

**Agency**

Each of the persons interviewed cited the Agency’s credibility as a key factor leading to significant increases in funding.
According to Secretary Hammond, before Secretary MacDonald arrived, the agency was organized around dispersed authority. Prior to his arrival, Headquarters had been renamed the “Service Center” and Regions and Project Engineers ran their projects to the best of their ability, using methods that were “home-grown.” WSDOT communicated little to the public, except where required to do so, and there was no centralized message or agency mission. After MacDonald took charge, WSDOT began to learn how to communicate the good work they had always done for the public, which rebuilt confidence in the agency. At the same time, WSDOT implemented project controls and centralizing reporting. With MacDonald at the helm, Headquarters role changed – Regions had to implement projects using the tools and requirements set down from a central authority.

MacDonald understood that new project controls were the price of receiving the Nickel funding. WSDOT’s managers and the staff had to be trained to use these new tools and understand the new requirements. Creating an excellent delivery record was required with the new funding. Communicating facts in a compelling way was also now required.

Secretary Hammond reports that there were challenges. For example, the agency was not prepared for line item budgeting when the legislature passed the Nickel Package. Many of the projects that were funded through the Nickel Package had been shelved years earlier, and there was not time update budgets or consider regulatory changes that happened in the mean time. Depending on the project, project managers were required to redesign to get the projects to fit within the budgets that were allocated. Many projects had good, recent estimates that fit with the budgets allocated. In a few cases, WSDOT had to go back to the Legislature and explain why they were unable to deliver with the budget allocated. WSDOT did this well, and its credibility continued to rise.

**Communications/Marketing**

WSDOT used several methods to communicate its messages: print media, websites, folios, quarterly reports, and polls.

Secretary MacDonald and other WSDOT executives went to editorial boards frequently. They made a point of creating events when a project was going to construction, giving them a chance to say in the media that the project was on time, and on budget. They also looked for opportunities to showcase interesting or innovative construction activities, and worked to get the media out to look at them.

WSDOT created four-page brochures, they dubbed “folios,” which they packed with interesting information. They created them for projects, issues, and processes.17

Quarterly reports were also prepared, officially titled, “Measures, Markers, and Mileposts,” and referred to as “The Grey Notebook.” The quarterly reports were packed with data and
information. MacDonald used these reports to track progress of projects (scope, schedule, budget), track issues around operation and maintenance activities, inform the legislature and the public of issues, and to highlight interesting topics.

WSDOT also created websites for each project. The sites not only describe the project, who is doing the work, and how to find out more, but also features a report card, complete with budget and construction statistics.

Secretary Hammond reports that polls were extremely helpful. After a few years of working on their communication, focusing on accountability and project delivery, WSDOT watched their poll ratings go up. Polls also showed the Legislature that transportation was at the top of the publics’ list of issues that needed addressed. Polls help them understand how important transportation was to the public, and gave them the permission they felt they needed to increase taxes.

The Transportation Partnership used a variety of tools in their effort to pursue and keep transportation funding in Washington. The group actively lobbied legislative leaders using coordinated messages. They polled the public and shared the results with leaders. They created posters, mailings, and press releases, identifying the right audiences, and targeting them. Using polling data, they were able to mold and shift their messages as the opposition rebutted them or new information was generated.

Lessons Learned
The people interviewed expressed numerous lessons learned. However, these lessons can be grouped into several themes.

Communication
To get and keep funding, your agency must be trusted by the Legislative bodies that will allocate the funding and the public the agency serves. Communicating your successes to the public is important. Being frank about your failures is essential.

All of the interviewees credit WSDOT’s recently built credibility as a primary factor in being given and keeping new funding. It’s an ongoing effort that requires a continued communication effort to demonstrate the agency’s progress on projects. Communication with the public and Legislative bodies has become a regular course of business for the agency. This fact allows them to use the same information when elections are underway and people are looking for data about the agency’s work. (Of course, WSDOT, as a public agency, is not allowed to advocate for or against any elective issue.) WSDOT’s reputation was essential for the successful passage of both of the initiatives.
WSDOT’s mission is “accountability, transparency, and project delivery” and “no surprises.” If you ask almost any WSDOT employee, they will be able to tell you that. The culture has shifted. This is important.

**Build Partners and Coalitions**
Establishing a program of specific funded projects was essential to building a coalition to support the initiatives.

The list of projects defined by the legislature to be implemented became a significant communication opportunity for the defenders of the program. On the WSDOT web, WSDOT was required by the legislature to identify, organize, and track all funded projects. WSDOT was able to quickly tag the projects that would be cut if the initiative passed. Each of these projects had proponents in the form of legislators, organizations, and communities. This became a very strong coalition of support.

**Collecting and Providing Excellent Data**
The Legislature requiring WSDOT to benchmark and institute performance measures also helped the Agency to create the foundation for collecting excellent data that they now use in their communications.

Providing data and organizing it in a way that it can be tracked and easily understood is essential. Having excellent data over time allows the Agency to explain its work and its performance with factual information, which is also critical when building or maintaining trust with the public and the Legislature. The Legislature asked the department tough questions, and WSDOT rose to the occasion, developing baselines and measurements for just about everything.
INITIATIVE 912 CANCELS:

WHY VOTE NO ON 912?
Earlier this year, our state took a giant step forward by approving a balanced statewide transportation plan — including tough accountability measures and annual audits to protect taxpayers.

INITIATIVE 912 PUTS AT RISK:
- Funding for 274 projects across Washington state to make highways safer and to keep traffic moving
- Coordination with prior transportation planning
- Traffic flow improvements in 69 locations
- Fixes for 100 high accident locations
- Upgrades to 172 bridges to withstand earthquakes
- Replacement of 53 deteriorating or outdated bridges
- 35 projects for trucks and trains
- Adding 73 miles of highway barrier to prevent cross-over accidents

SOURCE: Washington Dept. of Transportation

INITIATIVE 912 MEANS:

MORE TRAFFIC
Congestion is the result of failing roads, chokepoints and bottlenecks. The 2005 transportation package addresses congestion relief in a number of projects by adding lanes, investing in transit solutions, and helping to reduce back-ups and accidents. If any of the 274 projects don’t get built, people will be spending even more time stuck in traffic than they are today.

MORE COSTS
If Initiative 912 passes, vital road and bridge projects all over Washington will be canceled, costing taxpayers millions in extra interest costs. Plus, experts have repeatedly warned us that the next earthquake, big or small, could destroy the 520 bridge and the Alaskan Way Viaduct, bringing traffic and commerce across Washington state to a standstill, never mind the untold costs in lives as well.

MORE OF THE SAME
Initiative 912 is a statewide recipe for more of the same: Unchecked traffic gridlock and unsafe highways. The 912 campaign wants to do nothing about our transportation problems. They just want more of the same: more congestion.

For every month of delay, interest costs alone reach into the millions of dollars.

NO on 912
NO TO MORE OF THE SAME

To learn more about projects I-912 cancels in your neighborhood, go to: www.VoteNo912.org
NO TO MORE OF THE SAME
To learn more about projects I-912 cancels in your neighborhood, go to:
www.VoteNo912.org
Paid for by Keep Washington Rolling
P.O. Box 2505, Seattle WA 98111
p. 206-728-2507, f. 206-441-3753

INITIATIVE 912
STOPS LOCAL TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS IN YOUR COMMUNITY.

274 ROAD IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS ACROSS WASHINGTON CANCELED
EARLIER THIS YEAR, OUR STATE PASSED A PLAN FOR REAL PROGRESS

**274 Road Improvements Across Washington**

**WESTERN WA**
- 520 Bridge Expansion
- Alaskan Way Viaduct Replacement
- I-5 Corridor Expansion
- I-405 Expansion
- Hwy 9 Expansion
- Hwy 167 Expansion
- Ferry Improvements
- Hood Canal Bridge Improvements
- State Route 502 and 14 Widening

**EASTERN WA**
- Replace SR 290/Spokane River Bridge
- US 2/SR 902 Improvements
- 31 Highways Improved

**CENTRAL WA**
- Hwy 26 Expansion
- I-90 Snoqualmie Pass Expansion
- SR 240 Expansion
- US 12 and SR 240 Bridge Replacements

**INITIATIVE 912 TAKES IT ALL AWAY**

“My business relies on roads that are in good condition. I-912 cancels important road projects – and we can’t afford that. Vote no on 912.”

TERRY DORSING, Farmer, Royal City

“I drive our roads and cross our bridges every day, with my children. I don’t want unsafe roads and bridges. Vote no on I-912.”

DESIREE DUVALL, Lakewood Mom

“All across our state there are bridges that are unsafe and may not survive the next earthquake. We have seen the cost of not preparing. I-912 is a risk I am not willing to take. Vote No on 912.”

ERIC O’BRIEN, Transportation Engineer

NO on 912
NO to More of the Same
www.VoteNo912.org
1 Nickel Package budget, law. Engrossed Senate/House Bill 1163.
2 Transportation Partnership Investment Fund budget, law. Engrossed Senate Substitute Bill 6103.
4 Interview with former WSDOT Communications Director, Linda Mullen, February 24, 2009.
5 Grey Notebook web location: http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/accountability/graynotebook/default.htm
7 Interview with Senator Mary Margaret Haugen, May 28, 2009.
8 Seattle Times, October 9, 2003. Mulally has chilling words on state's business climate. http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20031009&slug=boeing09
12 Interview with Secretary Paula Hammond, March 19, 2009.
17 Folio Example: http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/51A0A12A-985C-4FF2-BED2-8F2B7B25226B/0/Tunnel_Experience_folio_May09.pdf